Strategic Communication with Side Information at the Decoder by Le Treust, Mael & Tomala, Tristan
HAL Id: hal-02357222
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-02357222
Submitted on 9 Nov 2019
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non,
émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de
recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires
publics ou privés.
Strategic Communication with Side Information at the
Decoder
Mael Le Treust, Tristan Tomala
To cite this version:
Mael Le Treust, Tristan Tomala. Strategic Communication with Side Information at the Decoder.
2019. ￿hal-02357222￿
1Strategic Communication with Side
Information at the Decoder
Maël Le Treust∗ and Tristan Tomala †
∗ ETIS UMR 8051, Université Paris Seine, Université Cergy-Pontoise, ENSEA, CNRS,
6, avenue du Ponceau, 95014 Cergy-Pontoise CEDEX, FRANCE
Email: mael.le-treust@ensea.fr
† HEC Paris, GREGHEC UMR 2959
1 rue de la Libération, 78351 Jouy-en-Josas CEDEX, FRANCE
Email: tomala@hec.fr
Abstract
We investigate the problem of strategic point-to-point communication with side information at the
decoder, in which the encoder and the decoder have mismatched distortion functions. The decoding
process is not supervised, it returns the output sequence that minimizes the decoder’s distortion function.
The encoding process is designed beforehand and takes into account the decoder’s distortion mismatch.
When the communication channel is perfect and no side information is available at the decoder, this
problem is referred to as the Bayesian persuasion game of Kamenica-Gentzkow in the Economics
literature. We formulate the strategic communication scenario as a joint source-channel coding problem
with side information at the decoder. The informational content of the source influences the design
of the encoding since it impacts differently the two distinct distortion functions. The side information
complexifies the analysis since the encoder is uncertain about the decoder’s belief on the source statistics.
We characterize the single-letter optimal solution by controlling the posterior beliefs induced by the
Wyner-Ziv’s source coding scheme. This confirms the benefit of sending encoded data bits even if the
decoding process is not supervised.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
What information should be communicated to a receiver who minimizes a mismatched distortion
metric? This new question arises in the context of the internet of things (IoT) composed of a
variety of devices which are able to interact and coordinate with each other in order to create new
applications/services and reach their own goals. In this context, wireless devices may have distinct
objectives. For example, adjacent access points in crowded downtown areas, seeking to transmit at the
same time, compete for the use of bandwidth; cognitive radio devices mitigate the interference effects
by allocating their power budget over several parallel multiple access channels, as in [1, Sec. IV]. Such
situations require new efficient techniques to coordinate communication traffic between devices whose
objectives are neither aligned, nor antagonistic. This question differs from the classical paradigm in
Information Theory which assumes that communicating devices are of two types: transmitters who pursue
the common goal of transferring information; or opponents who try to mitigate the communication, e.g. the
jammer corrupts the information, the eavesdropper infers it, the warden detects the covert transmission. In
this work, we characterize the information-theoretic limits of strategic communication between interacting
autonomous devices having general distortion functions, not necessarily aligned.
A. Scenario and contributions
We formulate the strategic communication problem as a joint source-channel coding problem with
decoder’s side information. We assume that the decoding process is not supervised, whereas the encoding
process is designed in advance and takes into account the decoder’s distortion mismatch. The side
information partially discloses the source symbols to the decoder and complicates the design of the
encoding, due to the mismatch of the distortion functions. Indeed, the encoder is uncertain about the
decoder’s belief on the source statistics. The closest paper in the literature is [4], in which no side
information is available at the decoder. The novel contributions are listed below.
1. We characterize the optimal encoder’s distortion for the problem of strategic communication with
side information at the decoder; we relate it to Wyner-Ziv’s rate-distortion function in [5] and to the
separation result by Merhav-Shamai in [6].
2. We determine the posterior beliefs induced by the Wyner-Ziv’s source coding, and we show that
the sequence of decoder’s optimal output is close to the output sequence of Wyner-Ziv’s decoding.
This confirms the benefit of sending encoded data bits to a non-supervised decoder, since the coding
scheme reveals the exact amount of information needed.
3. We formulate the optimal solution in terms of a linear program with an information constraint and
in terms of a convex closure of an auxiliary distortion function with an entropy constraint.
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34. We investigate an example with binary source and side information, and we compute the optimal
posterior beliefs for the doubly symmetric binary source of Wyner-Ziv [5, Sec. II].
We point out three essential features of strategic communication problem with decoder’s side
information.
1. Each source symbol has a different impact on the encoder and the decoder’s distortion functions,
hence it is optimal to encode each symbol differently.
2. The noiseless version of this problem without decoder’s side information corresponds to the Bayesian
persuasion game of Kamenica-Gentzkow [7]. In that case, the optimal information disclosure policy
requires a fixed amount of information bits. When the channel capacity is larger than this amount,
it is optimal not to use all the channel resource.
3. The decoder’s side information has two opposite effects on the optimal encoder’s distortion: it
enlarges the set of decoder’s posterior beliefs, so it may decrease the encoder’s distortion; it reveals
partial information to the decoder, so it forces some decoder’s best-reply symbols which might be
sub-optimal for the encoder’s distortion.
B. Related literature
The problem of “strategic communication” in information-theoretic setting has been formulated by
Akyol et al. in [8], [9], [10]. The authors characterize the optimal solution for Gaussian source, side
information and channel, with the Crawford-Sobel’s quadratic cost functions [11]. They prove that the
optimal solution in the one-shot problem is also optimal when considering several strategic communication
problems. This is not the case for general discrete source, channel and mismatched distortion functions.
These results were further extended in [12] for non-identical prior beliefs about the source and the
channel. The problem of strategic communication was introduced in the Control Theory literature by
Sarıtas¸ et al. in [13] and [14]. The authors extend the model of Crawford-Sobel to multidimentional
sources and noisy channels and they determine whether the optimal policies are linear or based on
some quantization. The connection to the binary hypothesis-testing problem was pointed out in [15].
Sender-receiver games are also investigated in [16], for the problem of “strategic estimation” involving
self-interested sensors; and in [17], [18], for the “network congestion” problem. In [19], [20], [21], the
authors investigate the computational aspects of the Bayesian persuasion game, when the signals are noisy.
In [22], [23], the interference channel coding problem is formulated as a game in which the users, i.e. the
pairs of encoder/decoder, are allowed to use any encoding/decoding strategy. The authors compute the
set of Nash equilibria for linear deterministic and Gaussian channels. The non-aligned devices’ objectives
are captured by distinct distortion functions. Coding for several distortion measures is investigated for
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4“multiple descriptions coding” in [24], for the lossy version of “Steinberg’s common reconstruction”
problem in [25], for the problem of minimax distortion redundancy in [26], for “lossy broadcasting” in
[27], for an alternative measure of “secrecy” in [28], [29], [30], [31].
The lossy source coding problem with mismatched distortion functions was formulated by Lapidoth, in
[32]. In this model, the decoder attempts to reconstruct a source sequence that was encoded with respect
to another distortion metric. The problem of the mismatch channel capacity was studied in [33], [34],
[35], [36], [37], in which the decoding metric is not necessarily matched with the channel statistics.
Zn
Un Xn Y n V n
P Te d
de(u, v) dd(u, v)
Fig. 1. The information source U and side information Z are drawn i.i.d. according to PUZ and the channel TY |X is memoryless.
The encoder e and the decoder d minimize mismatched distortion functions de(u, v) 6= dd(u, v).
The problem of “strategic information transmission” has been well studied in the Economics literature
since the seminal paper by Crawford-Sobel [11]. In this model, a better-informed sender transmits a
signal to a receiver, who takes an action which impacts both sender and receiver’s utility functions. The
problem consists in determining the optimal information disclosure policy given that the receiver’ best-
reply action affects the sender’s utility, see [38] for a survey. In [7], Kamenica-Gentzkow introduced the
Bayesian persuasion game in which the sender commits to an information disclosure policy before the
game starts. This subtle change of rules of the game induces a very different equilibrium solution related
to Stackelberg equilibrium [39], instead of Nash equilibrium [40]. This problem was later referred to
as “information design” in [41], [42], [43] and extended to the setting with “heterogeneous beliefs” in
[44] and [45]. In most of the articles in the Economics literature, the transmission between the sender
and the receiver is noise-free; except in [46], [47], [48] where the noisy transmission is investigated in a
finite block-length with no-error regime. Interestingly, Shannon’s mutual information is widely accepted
as a cost of information for the problem of “rational inattention” in [49] and for the problem of “costly
persuasion” in [50], without explicit reference to a coding problem.
Entropy and mutual information appear endogenously in repeated games with finite automata and
bounded recall [51], [52], [53], with private observation [54], or with imperfect monitoring [55], [56],
[57]. In [58], the authors investigate a sender-receiver game with common interests by formulating a
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5coding problem. They characterize the optimal solution via the mutual information. This result was later
refined by Cuff in [59] and referred to as the “coordination problem” in [60], [61], [62], [63].
The paper is organized as follows. The strategic communication problem is formulated in Sec.
II. The encoding and decoding strategies and the distortion functions are defined in Sec. II-A. The
strategic communication scenario is introduced in Sec. II-B. Our coding result and the four different
characterizations are stated in Sec. III. The first one is a linear program under an information constraint,
formulated in Sec. III-A. The main Theorem is stated in Sec.III-B, and the sketch of proof is in Sec.
III-C. In Sec. III-D, we reformulate the solution in terms of three different convex closures. Sec. IV
provides an example based on a binary source, binary side information and binary decoder’s actions. The
proofs are stated in App A - D.
II. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION PROBLEM
A. Coding strategies and distortion functions
We consider the i.i.d. probability distribution of information source PUZ and the conditional probability
distribution TY |X of the memoryless channel, depicted in Fig. 1. Uppercase letters U denote the random
variables, lowercase letters u denote the realizations and calligraphic fonts U denote the alphabets.
Notations Un, Zn, Xn, Y n, V n stand for sequences of random variables of information source
un = (u1, . . . , un) ∈ U
n, decoder’s side information zn ∈ Zn, channel inputs xn ∈ X n, channel outputs
yn ∈ Yn and decoder’s symbols vn ∈ Vn, respectively. The sets U , Z , X , Y , V have finite cardinality
and the notation ∆(X ) stands for the set of probability distributions over X , i.e. the probability simplex.
For a probability distribution QX ∈ ∆(X ), we write Q(x) instead of QX(x) for the probability value
assigned to realization x ∈ X . The notation QX(·|y) ∈ ∆(X ) denotes the conditional distribution
of X given the realization y ∈ Y and Q⊗nX ∈ ∆(X
n) denotes the i.i.d. probability distribution.
The distance between two probability distributions QX and PX is based on L1 norm, denoted by
||QX − PX ||1 =
∑
x∈X |Q(x) − P(x)|. The notation U −
− X −
− Y stands for the Markov chain
property corresponding to PY |XU = PY |X .
Definition II.1 (Encoding and decoding strategies)
The encoding strategy σ and the decoding strategy τ are defined by
σ : Un −→ ∆(X n), (1)
τ : Yn ×Zn −→ ∆(Vn). (2)
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6Both strategies (σ, τ) are stochastic and induce a joint probability distribution Pσ,τ ∈ ∆(U
n × Zn ×
X n × Yn × Vn) over the n-sequences of symbols, defined by
Pσ,τ =
( n∏
t=1
PUtZt
)
σXn|Un
( n∏
t=1
TYt|Xt
)
τV n|Y nZn. (3)
The encoding and decoding strategies (σ, τ) are defined in the same way as for the joint source-channel
coding problem with side information at the decoder studied in [6], based on Wyner-Ziv’s setting in [5].
Unlike these previous works, we assume that the encoder and the decoder minimize distincts distortion
functions.
Definition II.2 (Distortion functions) The single-letter distortion functions of the encoder and decoder
are defined by
de : U × Z × V −→ R, (4)
dd : U × Z × V −→ R. (5)
The long-run distortion functions dne (σ, τ) and d
n
d
(σ, τ) are evaluated with respect to the probability
distribution Pσ,τ induced by the strategies (σ, τ)
dne (σ, τ) =Eσ,τ
[
1
n
n∑
t=1
de(Ut, Zt, Vt)
]
=
∑
un,zn,vn
Pσ,τ
(
un, zn, vn
)
·
[
1
n
n∑
t=1
de(ut, zt, vt)
]
, (6)
dnd (σ, τ) =
∑
un,zn,vn
Pσ,τ
(
un, zn, vn
)
·
[
1
n
n∑
t=1
dd(ut, zt, vt)
]
. (7)
B. Strategic communication scenario
In this work, the encoder and the decoder are autonomous devices that choose the strategy σ and
τ in order to minimize their long-run distortion dne (σ, τ) and d
n
d
(σ, τ). We assume that the encoding
strategy σ is designed in advance, so that the decoder knows σ before the transmission takes place. The
decoder is not supervised and is free to choose any decoding strategy τ . This framework corresponds to
the Bayesian persuasion game [7], in which the encoder commits to an information disclosure policy σ,
and announces it to the decoder who chooses a best-reply strategy τ accordingly.
We assume that the strategic communication takes place as follows:
• The encoder chooses and announces the encoding strategy σ to the decoder.
• The sequences (Un, Zn,Xn, Y n) are drawn according to the joint probability distribution(∏n
t=1 PUtZt
)
σXn|Un
(∏n
t=1 TYt|Xt
)
.
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7• The decoder knows σ, observes the sequences of symbols (Y n, Zn), and draws a sequence of
symbols V n according to a best-reply strategy τV n|Y nZn .
Definition II.3 (Decoder’s Best-Replies) For any encoding strategy σ, the set of best-reply decoding
strategies BRd(σ) is defined by
BRd(σ) = argminτ d
n
d (σ, τ) =
{
τ, s.t. dnd (σ, τ) ≤ d
n
d (σ, τ˜ ), ∀τ˜ 6= τ
}
. (8)
In case there are several best-reply strategies, we assume that the decoder chooses the one that
maximizes the encoder’s distortion maxτ∈BRd(σ) d
n
e (σ, τ), so that encoder’s distortion is robust to the
exact specification of decoder’s strategy.
The coding problem under investigation consists in minimizing the encoder’s long-run distortion
inf
σ
max
τ∈BRd(σ)
dne (σ, τ). (9)
The decoding process τ is not supervised, it is strategic, causing the mismatch of the decoder’s output
sequence. The design of the encoding strategy σ anticipates this mismatch. Does the “strategic decoder”
necessarily decode the coded bits of information? We provide a positive answer in Theorem III.3, by
refining the analysis of the Wyner-Ziv’s coding scheme [5]. We show that the symbols induced by Wyner-
Ziv’s decoding τwz coincide with those induced by any best-reply τ ∈ BRd(σwz) to Wyner-Ziv’s encoding
σwz, for a large fraction of stages.
Remark II.4 (Stackelberg v.s. Nash equilibrium) The optimization problem in (9) corresponds to a
Stackelberg equilibrium [39] in which the encoder is the leader and the decoder is the follower, unlike
the Nash equilibrium [40] in which the two devices choose their strategy simultaneously.
Remark II.5 (Equal distortion functions) When the encoder and decoder have equal distortion func-
tions de = dd, the problem in (9) boils down to the classical approach of Wyner-Ziv [5] and Merhav-
Shamai [6], in which both strategies (σ, τ) are chosen jointly, in order to minimize a distortion function
inf
σ
max
τ∈BRd(σ)
dne (σ, τ) = inf
σ
min
τ
dne (σ, τ) = min
(σ,τ)
dne (σ, τ), (10)
since by Definition II.3, τ ∈ BRd(σ)⇐⇒ dnd (σ, τ) = minτ ′ d
n
d
(σ, τ ′).
III. CHARACTERIZATIONS
A. Linear program with an information constraint
We define the encoder’s optimal distortion D⋆e.
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8Definition III.1 (Target distributions) We consider an auxiliary random variable W ∈ W with |W| =
min
(
|U|+ 1, |V||Z|
)
. The set Q0 of target probability distributions is defined by
Q0 =
{
PUZQW |U , s.t., max
PX
I(X;Y )− I(U ;W |Z) ≥ 0
}
. (11)
We define the set Q2
(
QUZW
)
of single-letter best-replies of the decoder
Q2
(
QUZW
)
=argminQV |WZ E QUZW
QV |WZ
[
dd(U,Z, V )
]
. (12)
The encoder’s optimal distortion D⋆e is given by
D⋆e = inf
QUZW∈Q0
max
QV |WZ∈
Q2(QUZW )
E QUZW
QV |WZ
[
de(U,Z, V )
]
. (13)
We discuss the above definitions.
• The information constraint (11) of the set Q0 involves the channel capacity maxPX I(X;Y ) and the
Wyner-Ziv’s information rate I(U ;W |Z) = I(U ;W )− I(W ;Z), stated in [5]. It corresponds to the
separation result by Shannon [64], extended to the Wyner-Ziv setting by Merhav-Shamai in [6].
• For the clarity of the presentation, the set Q2
(
QUZW
)
contains stochastic functions QV |WZ ,
even if for the linear problem (12), some optimal QV |WZ are deterministic. If there are several
optimal QV |WZ , we assume the decoder chooses the one that maximize encoder’s distortion:
max QV |WZ∈
Q2(QUZW )
E
[
de(U,Z, V )
]
, so that encoder’s distortion is robust to the exact specification of
QV |WZ .
• The infimum over QUZW ∈ Q0 is not a minimum since the function max QV |WZ∈
Q2(QUZW )
E
[
de(U,Z, V )
]
is not continuous with respect to QUZW , see Fig. 10, 11.
• In [65, Theorem IV.2], the author shows that the sets Q0 and Q2 correspond to the target probability
distributions QUZWQV |WZ that are achievable for the problem of empirical coordination, see also
[60], [62]. As noticed in [66] and [67], the empirical coordination approach allows us to characterize
the “core of the decoder’s knowledge”, which captures what the decoder is able to infer about the
random variables involved in the problem.
• The value D⋆e corresponds to the Stackelberg equilibrium payoff of an auxiliary one-shot game in
which the decoder chooses QV |WZ , knowing in advance that the encoder has chosen QW |U ∈ Q0
and the distortion functions are E
[
de(U,Z, V )
]
and E
[
dd(U,Z, V )
]
.
Remark III.2 (Equal distortion functions) When the encoder and the decoder have equal distortion
functions dd = de, the set Q2
(
QUZW
)
is equal to argminQV |WZ E
[
de(U,Z, V )
]
. Thus, we have
max
QV |WZ∈
Q2(QUZW )
E QUZW
QV |WZ
[
de(U,Z, V )
]
= min
QV |WZ
E QUZW
QV |WZ
[
de(U,Z, V )
]
. (14)
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9Hence, the encoder’s optimal distortion D⋆e is equal to:
D⋆e = inf
QUZW∈Q0
max
QV |WZ∈
Q2(QUZW )
E QUZW
QV |WZ
[
de(U,Z, V )
]
(15)
= inf
QUZW∈Q0
min
QV |WZ
E QUZW
QV |WZ
[
de(U,Z, V )
]
(16)
= min
QUZW∈Q0,
QV |WZ
E QUZW
QV |WZ
[
de(U,Z, V )
]
. (17)
The infimum in (16) is replaced by a minimum in (17) due to the compactness of Q0 and the continuity of
minQV |WZ E
[
de(U,Z, V )
]
with respect to QUZW . We recover the distortion-rate function corresponding
to [6, Theorem 1].
B. Main result
We denote N⋆ = N \ {0} and characterize the encoder’s long-run optimal distortion (9).
Theorem III.3 (Main result) The long-run optimal distortion of the encoder satisfies:
∀ε > 0, ∃n¯ ∈ N⋆, ∀n ≥ n¯, inf
σ
max
τ∈BRd(σ)
dne (σ, τ) ≤ D
⋆
e − ε, (18)
∀n ∈ N⋆, inf
σ
max
τ∈BRd(σ)
dne (σ, τ) ≥ D
⋆
e. (19)
When removing the decoder’s side information Z = ∅ and changing the infimum to a supremum, we
recover our previous result [4, Theorem 3.1]. Theorem III.3 and Fekete’s lemma for a sub-additive
sequence in [68], show that the long-run encoder’s distortion converges to its infimum.
D⋆e = lim
n→+∞
inf
σ
max
τ∈BRd(σ)
dne (σ, τ) = inf
n∈N⋆
inf
σ
max
τ∈BRd(σ)
dne (σ, τ). (20)
C. Sketch of proof of Theorem III.3
We provide some intuitions for the main arguments of the proofs, which are given in App. B and C.
Proof of the achievability result (18). We analyse the posterior beliefs induced by the random coding
scheme obtained by concatenating Wyner-Ziv’s source coding [5] with Shannon’s channel coding [64]. We
consider a probability distribution QUZW such that 1) the capacity is strictly positive, 2) the information
constraints are satisfied with strict inequalities, 3) the set of best-reply symbol V⋆
(
z,QU (·|z, w)
)
of
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Definition III.4, is a singleton for all (z, w) ∈ Z ×W . We introduce the Wyner-Ziv’s coding rates R, RL
for the messages (M,L) and denote η > 0 the parameter such that
R + RL = I(U ;W ) + η, (21)
RL ≤ I(Z;W )− η, (22)
R ≤ max
PX
I(X;Y )− η. (23)
We denote by Eδ = 0, the event on which the messages (M,L) are recovered by the decoder and the
sequences are jointly typical
(
Un, Zn,W n,Xn, Y n
)
∈ Aδ with tolerance δ > 0.
The major step is to show that the posterior beliefs Pσ,Ut(·|y
n, zn, Eδ = 0) induced by coding scheme σ
regarding Ut at stage t ∈ {1, . . . , n}, are close on average to the target probability distribution QU (·|w, z):
Eσ
[
1
n
n∑
t=1
D
(
Pσ,Ut(·|Y
n, Zn, Eδ = 0)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣QUt(·|Wt, Zt))
]
≤2δ + η +
2
n
+ 2 log2 |U| · Pσ
(
Eδ = 1
)
:= ǫ. (24)
This is the purpose of the proof of Proposition B.1, stated in Appendix B-C.
Proof of the converse result (19). For any encoding strategy σ of length n ∈ N⋆, we introduce an
auxiliary random variable W = (Y n, Z−T , T ), where T is the uniform random variable over {1, . . . , n}
and Z−T stands for (Z1, . . . , Zt−1, Zt+1, . . . Zn), where ZT has been removed. We show that the Markov
chain W −
− UT −
− ZT is satisfied and that the probability distribution PUZW satisfy
P(u, z, w) =
1
n
· Pσ
(
ut, zt, y
n, z−t
)
, ∀(u,w, z, un, zn, yn). (25)
We define τ˜V |WZ = τVT |Y nZn and we prove that for both encoder and decoder, the long-run distortion
writes
dne (σ, τ) =
∑
u,z,w
P(u, z, w)
∑
v
τ˜(v|w, z) · de(u, z, v), (26)
hence
τ ∈ argminτ ′V n|Y nZn Eστ ′
[
1
n
n∑
t=1
φd(ut, zt, vt)
]
⇐⇒τ˜V |WZ ∈ Q2
(
PUZW
)
. (27)
Well known arguments from [5] and [6] show that
0 ≤max
PX
I(X;Y )− I(U ;W |Z), (28)
therefore, for any encoding strategy σ and all n, we have
max
τ∈BRd(σ)
dne (σ, τ) ≥ inf
QUZW∈Q0
max
QV |WZ∈
Q2(QUZW )
E QUZW
QV |WZ
[
de(U,Z, V )
]
= D⋆e. (29)
November 9, 2019 DRAFT
11
D. Convex closure formulation
The convex closure of a function f is the largest convex function vex f : X → R∪{−∞} everywhere
smaller than f on X. In this section, we reformulate the encoder’s optimal distortion D⋆e in terms of
a convex closure, similarly to [7, Corollary 1] and [4, Definition 2.4]. This alternative approach may
simplify the optimization problem in (13), by plugging the decoder’s posterior beliefs and best-reply
symbols into the encoder’s distortion function. The goal of the strategic communication is to control the
posterior beliefs of the decoder, knowing it will choose a best-reply symbol afterwards.
Before the transmission, the decoder holds a prior belief corresponding to the source’s statistics PU ∈
∆(U). After observing the pair of symbols (w, z) ∈ W × Z , the decoder updates its posterior belief
QU (·|z, w) ∈ ∆(U) according to Bayes rule Q(u|z, w) =
P(u,z)Q(w|u)∑
u′ P(u
′,z)Q(w|u′) , for all (u, z, w) ∈ U×W×Z .
Lemma 1 (Markov property on posterior belief) The Markov chain property Z −
−U −
−W implies
that the posterior beliefs QU (·|z, w) ∈ ∆(U) can be expressed from the interim beliefs QU (·|w) ∈ ∆(U),
Q(u|w, z) =
Q(u, z, w)
Q(z, w)
=
Q(u, z|w)∑
u′ Q(u
′, z|w)
=
Q(u|w)P(z|u)∑
u′ Q(u
′|w)P(z|u′)
, ∀(u, z, w) ∈ U × Z ×W.
(30)
Definition III.4 (Best-reply) For each symbol z ∈ Z and belief p ∈ ∆(U), the decoder chooses the
best-reply v⋆(z, p) that belongs to the set V⋆(z, p), defined by
V⋆(z, p) = argmax
v∈argmin Ep
[
dd(U,z,v)
] Ep[de(U, z, v)]. (31)
If several symbols are best-reply to z ∈ Z and belief p ∈ ∆(U), the decoder chooses the worst one for
encoder’s distortion. This is a reformulation of the maximum in (13).
Definition III.5 (Robust distortion) For a symbol z ∈ Z and a belief p ∈ ∆(U), the encoder’s robust
distortion function is defined by
ψe(z, p) = Ep
[
de
(
U, z, v⋆(z, p)
)]
, (32)
where the best-reply v⋆(z, p) belongs to the set defined by (31).
Definition III.6 (Average distortion and average entropy) For each belief p ∈ ∆(U), we define the
average distortion function Ψe(p) and average entropy function h(p) by
Ψe(p) =
∑
u,z
p(u) · P(z|u) · ψe
(
z, pU (·|z)
)
, where pU (u|z) =
p(u) · P(z|u)∑
u′ p(u
′) · P(z|u′)
∀(u, z), (33)
h(p) =H(p) +
∑
u
p(u) ·H
(
PZ(·|u)
)
−H
(∑
u
p(u) · PZ(·|u)
)
. (34)
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The conditional probability distribution PZ(·|u) is given by the information source. Note that h(PU ) =
H(U |Z).
Lemma 2 (Concavity) The average entropy h(p) is concave in p ∈ ∆(U).
Proof. [Lemma 2] The average entropy h(p) in (34) is equal to the conditional entropy H(U |Z) evaluated
with respect to the probability distribution p · PZ|U ∈ ∆(U × Z). The mutual information I(U ;Z) is
convex in p ∈ ∆(U) (see [69, pp. 23]), and the entropy H(U) is concave in p ∈ ∆(U). Hence the
conditional entropy h(p) = H(U |Z) = H(U)− I(U ;Z) is concave in p ∈ ∆(U).
Theorem III.7 (Convex closure) The solution D⋆e of (13) is the convex closure of Ψe(p) evaluated at
the prior distribution PU , under an information constraint,
D⋆e = inf
{∑
w
λw ·Ψe(pw) s.t.
∑
w
λw · pw = PU ∈ ∆(U),
and
∑
w
λw · h(pw) ≥ H(U |Z)−max
PX
I(X;Y )
}
, (35)
where the infimum is taken over λw ∈ [0, 1] summing up to 1 and pw ∈ ∆(U), for each w ∈ W with
|W| = min
(
|U|+ 1, |V||Z|
)
.
The proof of Theorem III.7, stated in App. A, rely on the Markov chain property Z −
−U −
−W . When
removing, the decoder’s side information, e.g. |Z| = 1, and changing the infimum into a supremum,
we recover the value of the optimal splitting problem of [4, Definition 2.4]. The “splitting Lemma” by
Aumann and Maschler [70], also called “Bayes plausibility” in [7], ensures that the strategy Q(w|u) =
λw·pw(u)
P(u) induces the collection of posterior beliefs (λw, pw)w∈W , also referred to as “the splitting of the
prior belief”. Formulation (35) provides an alternative point of view on the encoder’s optimal distortion
(13).
• The optimal solution D⋆e can be found by adapting the concavification method [70], to the
minimization problem. In Sec IV, we investigate an example involving binary source and side
information and we compute explicitly the optimal strategy for the Wyner-Ziv’s example with a
doubly symmetric binary source (DSBS), in [5, Sec. II, pp. 3].
• When the channel is perfect and has a large input alphabet |X | ≥ min(|U|, |V||Z|), the strategic
communication problem is equivalent to several i.i.d. copies of the one-shot problem, whose optimal
solution is obtained by removing the information constraint (35). This noise-free setting is related
to the problem of persuasion with heterogeneous beliefs, investigated in [44] and [45].
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• The information constraint
∑
w λw · h(pw) ≥ H(U |Z)−maxPX I(X;Y ) in (35) is a reformulation
of I(U ;W |Z) ≤ maxPX I(X;Y ) in (11), since∑
w
λw · h(pw) =
∑
w
λw ·H(U |Z,W = w) = H(U |Z,W ). (36)
• The dimension of the problem (35) is |U|. Caratheodory’s Lemma (see [71, Corollary 17.1.5, pp.
157] and [4, Corollary A.2, pp. 26]) provides the cardinality bound |W| = |U|+ 1.
• The cardinality ofW is also restricted by the vector of recommended symbols |W| = |V||Z|, telling to
the decoder which symbol to return for each side information. Otherwise assume that two posteriors
pw1 and pw2 induce the same vectors of symbols v
1 = (v11 , . . . , v
1
|Z|) = v
2 = (v21 , . . . , v
2
|Z|). Then,
both posteriors pw1 and pw2 can be replaced by their average:
p˜ =
λw1 · pw1 + λw2 · pw2
λw1 + λw2
, (37)
without changing the distortion and still satisfying the information constraint:
h(p˜) ≥
λw1 · h(pw1) + λw2 · h(pw2)
λw1 + λw2
(38)
=⇒
∑
w 6=w1,
w 6=w2
λw · h(pw) + (λw1 + λw2) · h(p˜) ≥ H(U |Z)−max
PX
I(X;Y ). (39)
Inequality (38) comes from the concavity of h(p), stated in Lemma 2.
The splitting under information constraint of Theorem III.7 can be reformulated in terms of Lagrangian
and in terms of the convex closure of Ψ˜e(p, ν) defined by
Ψ˜e(p, ν) =
Ψe(p), if ν ≤ h(p),+∞, otherwise. (40)
Theorem III.8 The optimal solution D⋆e reformulates as:
D⋆e =sup
t≥0
{
vex
[
Ψe + t · h
](
PU
)
− t ·
(
H(U |Z)−max
PX
I(X;Y )
)}
(41)
=vex Ψ˜e
(
PU ,H(U |Z)−max
PX
I(X;Y )
)
. (42)
Equation (41) is the convex closure of a Lagrangian that integrates the information constraint and equation
(42) corresponds to the convex closure of a a bi-variate function where the information constraint requires
an additional dimension. The proof follows directly from [4, Theorem 3.3, pp. 37], by replacing concave
closure by convex closure.
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IV. EXAMPLE WITH BINARY SOURCE AND SIDE INFORMATION
We consider a binary source U ∈ {u0, u1} with probability distribution P(u1) = p0 ∈ [0, 1]. The
binary side information Z ∈ {z0, z1} is drawn according to the conditional probability distribution
P(z|u) with parameter δ0 ∈ [0, 1] and δ1 ∈ [0, 1]. The cardinality bound in Definition III.1 is |W| =
min
(
|U|+1, |V||Z|
)
= 3, hence the random variable W is drawn according to the conditional probability
distribution Q(w|u) with parameters (αk, βk)k∈{1,2,3} ∈ [0, 1]
6 such that
∑
k αk =
∑
k βk = 1. The joint
probability distribution P(u, z)Q(w|u) is depicted in Fig. 2.
u1
u0
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
b
w3
w1
w2
z1
z0
α1
β3
1− p0
p0
α3
α2
β1
β2
1− δ0
δ0
1− δ1
δ1
Fig. 2. Joint probability distribution P(u, z)Q(w|u) depending on parameters p0, δ0, δ1, (αk, βk)k∈{1,2,3}.
The encoder minimizes the Hamming distortion de(u, v) given by Fig. 3. The decoder’s distortion in
Fig. 4 includes an extra cost κ ∈ [0, 1] when it returns the symbol v1 instead of the symbol v0. The extra
cost κ may capture a computing cost, an energy cost, or the fact that an estimation error for the symbol
v1 is more harmful than an estimation error for the symbol v0.
u1
u0
v0 v1
0
1
1
0
Fig. 3. Encoder’s distortion function de(u, v).
u1
u0
v0 v1
0
1
1 + κ
κ
Fig. 4. Decoder’s distortion dd(u, v) with extra cost κ ∈ [0, 1].
A. Decoder’s best-reply
After receiving the pair of symbols (w, z), the decoder updates its posterior belief QU (·|w, z) ∈ ∆(U),
according to Bayes rule. We denote by p = Q(u1|w, z) ∈ [0, 1] the parameter of the posterior belief.
Given the extra cost is κ = 34 and we denote by γ =
1+κ
2 =
7
8 the belief threshold at which the decoder
changes its symbol, as in Fig. 5. When the decoder’s belief is exactly equal to the threshold p = γ = 78 ,
the decoder is indifferent between the two symbols {v0, v1}, by convention we assume that it chooses
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v0, i.e. the worst symbol for the encoder. Hence the decoder chooses a best-reply v⋆0 or v
⋆
1 depending on
the interval [0, γ] or (γ, 1] in which lies the belief parameter p ∈ [0, 1], see Fig. 5.
0 1 p
Ep
[
dd(U, v)
]
1 + κ = 74
κ = 34
1
v1
v0
γ
=
1+
κ2
=
7
8
b
Fig. 5. Decoder’s expected distortion Ep
[
dd(U, v)
]
= (1 − p) · dd(u0, v) + p · dd(u1, v) for v ∈ {v0, v1}, depending on the
belief parameter p = Q(u1|w, z) ∈ [0, 1]. For an extra cost κ = 34 , the decoder’s best-reply is the symbol v
⋆
0 if the posterior
belief p ∈ [0, γ] and v⋆1 if p ∈ (γ, 1] with γ =
7
8
.
B. Interim and posterior belief
The correlation between random variables (U,Z) is fixed whereas the correlation between random
variables (U,W ) is selected by the encoder. This imposes a strong relationship between the iterim belief
QU |W induced by the encoder, and the posterior belief QU |WZ that determine the decoder’s best-reply
symbol v. For a symbol w ∈ W , we denote the interim belief by q = Q(u1|w) ∈ [0, 1]. Lemma 1 ensures
that the posterior belief depending on the side information z0 or z1, are given by
Q(u1|w, z0) =
Q(u1|w) · P(z0|u1)
Q(u0|w) · P(z0|u0) +Q(u1|w) · P(z0|u1)
=
q · δ1
(1− q) · (1− δ0) + q · δ1
=: p0(q), (43)
Q(u1|w, z1) =
Q(u1|w) · P(z1|u1)
Q(u0|w) · P(z1|u0) +Q(u1|w) · P(z1|u1)
=
q · (1− δ1)
(1− q) · δ0 + q · (1− δ1)
=: p1(q). (44)
The posterior beliefs after receiving the side information z0 or z1 are related to the interim belief q ∈ [0, 1]
through the two functions p0(q), p1(q), depicted on Fig. 6.
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0
1
1 qp
0 =
0.5
p0 = P(u1) = 0.5
P(u1|z0) = 0.344828
P(u1|z1) = 0.909091
b
b
b
b
b b
b
γ = 0.875
ν
0 =
0.930069
ν
1 =
0.411765
bb
bb b
b
b
b
b p0(ν1) = 0.269231
p1(ν0) = 0.992537
p1(q)
p0(q)
Fig. 6. The posterior beliefs functions p0(q) and p1(q) defined in (43) and (44), depending on the interim belief q ∈ [0, 1], for
p0 = 0.5, δ1 = 0.05, δ2 = 0.5 and γ = 0.875.
C. Encoder’s average distortion function
Given the belief threshold γ = 78 at which the decoder changes its symbol, we define the parameters
ν0 and ν1 such that p0(ν0) = γ and p1(ν1) = γ.
γ = p0(ν0) ⇐⇒ ν0 =
γ · (1− δ0)
δ1 · (1− γ) + γ · (1− δ0)
, (45)
γ = p1(ν1) ⇐⇒ ν1 =
γ · δ0
γ · δ0 + (1− δ1) · (1− γ)
. (46)
Remark IV.1 We have the equivalence ν1 < ν0 ⇐⇒ δ0 + δ1 < 1.
Since the distortion functions of Fig. 3, 4 do not depend on the side information z, we denote by ψe(p)
the robust distortion function of Definition III.5, given by
ψe(p) = min
v∈argmin
(1−p)·d
d
(u0,v)+p·dd(u1,v)
(1− p) · de(u0, v) + p · de(u1, v), (47)
= 1
(
p ≤ γ
)
·
(
(1− p) · de(u0, v0) + p · de(u1, v0)
)
+ 1
(
p > γ
)
·
(
(1− p) · de(u0, v1) + p · de(u1, v1)
)
(48)
= p · 1
(
p ≤ γ
)
+ (1− p) · 1
(
p > γ
)
. (49)
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Without loss of generality, we assume that δ0 + δ1 < 1, hence ν1 < ν0. The average distortion function
Ψe(q) of Definition III.6 depends on the interim belief parameter q ∈ [0, 1] as follows
Ψe(q) =Pq(z0) · ψe
(
p0(q)
)
+ Pq(z1) · ψe
(
p1(q)
)
(50)
=
(
(1− q) · (1− δ0) + q · δ1
)
·
(
p0(q) · 1
(
p0(q) ≤ γ
)
+ (1− p0(q)) · 1
(
p0(q) > γ
))
+
(
(1− q) · δ0 + q · (1− δ1)
)
·
(
p1(q) · 1
(
p1(q) ≤ γ
)
+ (1− p1(q)) · 1
(
p1(q) > γ
))
(51)
=q · 1
(
q ≤ ν1
)
+
(
q · δ1 + (1− q) · δ0
)
· 1
(
ν1 < q ≤ ν0
)
+ (1− q) · 1
(
q > ν0
)
. (52)
In Fig. 7, 8 and 11, the average distortion function Ψe(q) are represented by the orange lines, whereas
the black curve is the average entropy h(q) defined by
h(q) =Hb(q) + (1− q) ·Hb(δ0) + q ·Hb(δ1)−Hb
(
(1− q) · δ0 + q · (1− δ1)
)
. (53)
D. Optimal splitting with three posteriors
Since the cardinality bound is |W| = min
(
|U| + 1, |V||Z|
)
= 3, we consider a splitting of the prior
p0 in three posteriors (q1, q2, q3) ∈ [0, 1]3 with respective weights (λ1, λ2, λ3) ∈ [0, 1]3, defined by (54),
(55).
1 =λ1 + λ2 + λ3, (54)
p0 =λ1 · q1 + λ2 · q2 + λ3 · q3, (55)
H(U |Z)− C =λ1 · h(q1) + λ2 · h(q2) + λ3 · h(q3), (56)
Equation (56) is satisfied when the information constraint is binding. By inverting the system (54)-(56),
we obtain
λ1 =
(
H(U |Z)−C
)
· (q2 − q3) + h(q2) · (q3 − p0) + h(q3) · (p0 − q2)
h(q1) · (q2 − q3) + h(q2) · (q3 − q1) + h(q3) · (q1 − q2)
, (57)
λ2 =
(
H(U |Z)−C
)
· (q3 − q1) + h(q3) · (q1 − p0) + h(q1) · (p0 − q3)
h(q1) · (q2 − q3) + h(q2) · (q3 − q1) + h(q3) · (q1 − q2)
, (58)
λ3 =
(
H(U |Z)−C
)
· (q1 − q2) + h(q1) · (q2 − p0) + h(q2) · (p0 − q1)
h(q1) · (q2 − q3) + h(q2) · (q3 − q1) + h(q3) · (q1 − q2)
. (59)
The triple of posteriors (q1, q2, q3) is feasible if and only if the weights (λ1, λ2, λ3) belong to the interval
[0, 1]3. The average distortion Ψe(q) is piece-wise linear, hence the optimal triple of posteriors may
belong to distinct intervals q1 ∈ [0, ν1), q2 ∈ [ν1, ν2), q3 ∈ [ν2, 1]. Otherwise, take the average of two
posteriors of the same interval which provides the same distortion value and has a larger entropy, due to
the strict concavity of entropy function.
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Aumann and Maschler’s splitting lemma [70] or Kamenica and Gentzkow’s Bayes plausibility [7] claim
that the splitting p0 = λ1 · q1 + λ2 · q2 + λ3 · q3 is implemented by the following strategy
Q(wk|u0) =Q(wk) ·
1−Q(u1|wk)
1− P(u1)
= λk ·
1− qk
1− p0
=: αk, k ∈ {, 1, 2, 3} (60)
Q(wk|u1) =Q(wk) ·
Q(u1|wk)
P(u1)
= λk ·
qk
p0
=: βk, k ∈ {, 1, 2, 3}. (61)
0
1
1 q
b
q
2 =
p
0 =
0.5
b b
ν
1 =
0.7
ν
2 =
0.3
δ0 = δ1 = 0.3
bb
b
b
H(U |Z)− C = 0.6813
h(q⋆) = 0.5375
b b
b
b
b
b
q
3 =
1−
q ⋆
=
0.855
q
1 =
q ⋆
=
0.145
b b
b b D⋆e = 0.2098
Fig. 7. Wyner-Ziv’s example for DSBS. When C ∈ [0, H(U |Z)− h(q⋆)] the optimal splitting is (q1, q2, q3) = (q⋆, 1
2
, 1− q⋆).
For the parameters p0 = 0.5, δ0 = δ1 = 0.3, C = 0.2, κ = 0, the optimal encoder’s distortion is D
⋆
e = 0.2098.
E. Wyner-Ziv’s example for DSBS with p0 = 0.5, δ0 = δ1 = 0.3, κ = 0
We investigate the example of doubly symmetric binary source (DSBS) with δ0 = δ1 = 0.3 whose
solution is characterized in [5, Sec. II, pp. 3]. In this example, both encoder and decoder minimize the
Hamming distortion, hence κ = 0⇐⇒ γ = 12 . We introduce the notation q ⋆ δ := (1− q) · δ+ q · (1− δ),
the average distortion and average entropy write
Ψe(q) =q · 1
(
q ≤ δ
)
+ δ · 1
(
δ < q ≤ 1− δ
)
+ (1− q) · 1
(
q > 1− δ
)
, (62)
h(q) =H(U |Z) +Hb(q)−Hb
(
q ⋆ δ
)
. (63)
We remark that H(U |Z)− h(q) = Hb
(
q ⋆ δ
)
−Hb(q).
Proposition IV.2 We denote by q⋆ the unique solution of
h′(q) =
H(U |Z)− h(q)
δ − q
. (64)
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0
1
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b
q
2 =
p
0 =
0.5
b b
ν
1 =
0.7
ν
2 =
0.3
δ0 = δ1 = 0.3
b
b
b
b
b b
H(U |Z)− C = 0.4813
h(q⋆) = 0.5375
b b
b b
1
−
q ⋆
=
0.855
q ⋆
=
0.145
q
3 =
0.8788
q
1 =
0.1212
b bb b
b D⋆e = 0.1212
Fig. 8. Wyner-Ziv’s example for DSBS. When C ∈ [H(U |Z) − h(q⋆),H(U |Z)] the optimal splitting has two posteriors
(q1, q3) =
(
h−1
(
H(U |Z) − C
)
, 1 − h−1
(
H(U |Z) − C
))
. For parameters p0 = 0.5, δ0 = δ1 = 0.3, C = 0.4, κ = 0, the
optimal encoder’s distortion is D⋆e = 0.1212.
0
C
1 D⋆e
b
p
0 =
0.5
q ⋆
=
0.145
δ
=
0.3
b
b
b
b
b
b b
H(U |Z) = 0.8813
H(U |Z)− h(q⋆) = 0.3438
H(U |Z)− h(δ) = 0.1002
Fig. 9. Optimal trade-off between the capacity C and the optimal distortion D⋆e for the DSBS with parameters p0 = 0.5,
δ0 = δ1 = 0.3, κ = 0.
1) If C ∈ [0,H(U |Z)− h(q⋆)], then the optimal splitting (Fig. 7) has three posterior beliefs
q1 = q
⋆ q2 =
1
2 q3 = 1− q
⋆
λ1 =
1
2 ·
C
H(U |Z)−h(q⋆) λ2 = 1−
C
H(U |Z)−h(q⋆) λ3 =
1
2 ·
C
H(U |Z)−h(q⋆)
corresponding to the strategies
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α1 = (1− q
⋆) · C
H(U |Z)−h(q⋆) α2 = 1−
C
H(U |Z)−h(q⋆) α3 = q
⋆ · C
H(U |Z)−h(q⋆)
β1 = q
⋆ · C
H(U |Z)−h(q⋆) β2 = 1−
C
H(U |Z)−h(q⋆) β3 = (1− q
⋆) · C
H(U |Z)−h(q⋆)
and the optimal distortion is
D⋆e =δ − C ·
δ − q⋆
H(U |Z)− h(q⋆)
(65)
2) If C ∈ [H(U |Z)− h(q⋆),H(U |Z)], then the optimal splitting (Fig. 8) has two posterior beliefs
q1 = h
−1
(
H(U |Z)− C
)
q2 =
1
2 q3 = 1− h
−1
(
H(U |Z)− C
)
λ1 =
1
2 λ2 = 0 λ3 =
1
2
corresponding to the strategies
α1 = 1− h
−1
(
H(U |Z)− C
)
α2 = 0 α3 = h
−1
(
H(U |Z)− C
)
β1 = h
−1
(
H(U |Z)− C
)
β2 = 0 β3 = 1− h
−1
(
H(U |Z)− C
)
and the optimal distortion is
D⋆e =h
−1
(
H(U |Z)− C
)
, (66)
where the notation h−1
(
H(U |Z)−C
)
stands for the unique solution of equation h(q) = H(U |Z)−C .
3) If C > H(U |Z), then the optimal splitting rely on the two extreme posterior beliefs (0, 1) and
D⋆e = 0.
The proof of Proposition IV.2 is given in the Appendix D. When C ≤ H(U |Z) − h(q⋆), the optimal
strategy consists of a time-sharing between the operating point (D⋆e, C) =
(
q⋆,H(U |Z)−h(q⋆)
)
and the
zero rate point (δ, 0), as depicted in Fig. 9.
F. Distinct distortions without side information, p0 = 0.5, δ0 = 0.5, δ1 = 0.5, C = 0.2, κ =
3
4
We consider that the parameters δ1 = δ2 = 0.5 so that the side information Z is independent of
the source U . This corresponds to the problem studied in [4], when replacing the minimization by the
maximization. We have Hb(δ0) = Hb(δ1) = Hb
(
(1 − q) · δ0 + q · (1 − δ1)
)
= 1 and ν1 = ν2 = γ =
7
8 ,
the average entropy and average distortion write
h(q) =Hb(q), (67)
Ψe(q) =ψe(q) = p · 1
(
p ≤ γ
)
+ (1− p) · 1
(
p > γ
)
. (68)
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Fig. 10. For the parameters p0 = 0.5, δ1 = δ2 = 0.5, C = 0.2, κ = 3
4
, the optimal encoder’s distortion D⋆e = 0.2668.
Applying [4, Corollary 3.5, pp. 15], the optimal splitting has two posteriors |W| = 2 and must satisfy
the information constraint
p0 − q2
q1 − q2
·Hb(q1) +
q1 − p0
q1 − q2
·Hb(q2) ≥ H(U)− C. (69)
The distortion function has two piece-wise linear components, hence the optimal splitting involves q1 ∈
[0, p0] and q2 ∈ [γ, 1]. For each q2 ∈ [γ, 1], we denote by q1(q2) the function that returns the posterior
which satisfies (69) with equality. From [4, Fig. 5, pp. 19], the function q1(q2) is strictly increasing,
hence its derivative q′1(q2) is strictly positive. The encoder’s distortion function reformulates in terms of
q2 as
Φe(q2) =
p0 − q2
q1(q2)− q2
· q1(q2) +
q1 − p0
q1(q2)− q2
· (1− q2). (70)
Its derivative writes
Φ′e(q2) =
1
(q1(q2)− q2)2
·
(
q′1(q2) ·
(
q2 · (2 · q2 − 1) + p0
)
− (p0 − q1(q2)) · (1− 2 · q1(q2))
)
. (71)
Since q2 ≥ γ >
1
2 , the sign of the derivative is negative if and only if
0 < q′1(q2) ≤
(p0 − q1(q2)) · (1− 2 · q1(q2))
q2 · (2 · q2 − 1) + p0
. (72)
By numerical optimization, the above inequality is satisfied for p0 = 0.5, δ1 = δ2 = 0.5, C = 0.2, κ =
3
4 ,
hence the optimal distortion is achieved by using q2 = γ, as depicted on Fig. 10.
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Fig. 11. For the parameters p0 = 0.5, δ0 = 0.05, δ1 = 0.5, C = 0.2, κ = 34 , the optimal encoder’s distortion is D
⋆
e = 0.1721.
G. Distinct distortions with side information, p0 = 0.5, δ0 = 0.05, δ1 = 0.5, C = 0.2, κ =
3
4
We consider an example with distinct distortion functions, i.e. with κ = 34 , with decoder’s side
information. By numerical simulation, we determine the optimal triple of posteriors (q1, q2, q3) represented
by the red dots in Fig. 11, that corresponds to the minimal distortion D⋆e = 0.1721.
q1 = 0.0715 q2 = 0.4118 q3 = 0.9301
λ1 = 0.1288 λ2 = 0.6165 λ3 = 0.2548
The parameters of the optimal strategy in Fig. 2, are given by
α1 = 0.2392 α2 = 0.7252 α2 = 0.0356
β1 = 0.0184 β2 = 0.5077 β3 = 0.4739
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APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM III.7
We consider a joint probability distribution QUW ∈ ∆(U×W), we identify the parameters λw = Q(w)
and pw = QU (·|w) ∈ ∆(U). The average distortion writes∑
w
λw ·Ψe(pw) =
∑
w
Q(w) ·Ψe
(
QU (·|w)
)
(73)
=
∑
w
Q(w) ·
∑
u,z
Q(u|w) · P(z|u) · ψe
(
z,QU (·|w, z)
)
(74)
=
∑
w,z
Q(w) · Q(z|w) · EQU(·|w,z)
[
de
(
U, z, v⋆
(
z,QU (·|w, z)
))]
(75)
=EQUZW
[
de
(
U,Z, V ⋆
(
Z,QU (·|W,Z)
))]
(76)
= max
QV |ZW ∈
Q2(QUZW )
E QUZW
QV |ZW
[
de(U,Z, V )
]
. (77)
Equations (74), (75) and (77) come from Definitions III.6, III.5 and III.4.
Equations (73) and (76) are reformulations.
The average entropy writes∑
w
λw · h(pw) =
∑
w
Q(w) · h
(
QU (·|w)
)
(78)
=
∑
w
Q(w) ·
(
H
(
QU (·|w)
)
+
∑
u
Q(u|w) ·H
(
PZ(·|u)
)
−H
(∑
u
Q(u|w) · PZ(·|u)
))
(79)
=
∑
w
Q(w) ·
(
H
(
QU (·|w)
)
+
∑
u
Q(u|w) ·H
(
QZ(·|u,w)
)
−H
(
QZ(·|w)
))
(80)
=H(U |W ) +H(Z|U,W )−H(Z|W ) = H(U |W,Z). (81)
Equation (79) come from Definition III.6.
Equation (80) come from Markov chain property Z −
−U −
−W that implies PZ(·|u) = QZ(·|u,w) and
QZ(·|w) =
∑
uQ(u|w) · PZ(·|u).
Equations (78) and (81) are reformulations.
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Hence, equation (35) reformulates
inf
λw∈[0,1],
pw∈∆(U)
{∑
w
λw ·Ψe(pw) s.t.
∑
w
λw · pw = PU ∈ ∆(U),
and
∑
w
λw · h(pw) ≥ H(U |Z)−max
PX
I(X;Y )
}
(82)
= inf
QW ,QU|W
{
max
QV |ZW∈
Q2(QUZW )
E QUZW
QV |ZW
[
de(U,Z, V )
]
s.t.
∑
w
Q(w) · QU (·|w) = PU ∈ ∆(U),
and H(U |W,Z) ≥ H(U |Z)−max
PX
I(X;Y )
}
(83)
= inf
QUZW∈Q0
max
QV |ZW∈
Q2(QUZW )
E QUZW
×QV |ZW
[
de(U,Z, V )
]
= D⋆e. (84)
This concludes the proof of Theorem III.7.
APPENDIX B
ACHIEVABILITY PROOF OF THEOREM III.3
We refine the analysis of the Wyner-Ziv’s source coding scheme [5], in order to control the posterior
beliefs of a large fraction of stages, as stated in Proposition B.1 and in (96)-(97). Corollary B.3 shows
that the best-reply strategy of the decoder performs similarly as the Wyner-Ziv’s decoding scheme.
A. Zero capacity
We first investigate the special case of zero capacity.
Lemma 3 If the channel has zero capacity maxPX I(X;Y ) = 0, then we have:
∀n ∈ N⋆, ∀σ, max
τ∈BRd(σ)
dne (σ, τ) = D
⋆
e. (85)
Proof. [Lemma 3] When capacity is zero maxPX I(X;Y ) = 0, then the probability distribution
PUZQW |U ∈ Q0 must satisfy I(U ;W |Z) = 0, hence the Markov chain property U −
− Z −
− W ,
i.e. QU |ZW = PU |Z .
D⋆e = inf
QUZW∈Q0
max
QV |WZ∈
Q2(QUZW )
E QUZW
QV |WZ
[
de(U,Z, V )
]
(86)
= inf
QUZW∈Q0
EQUZW
[
de
(
U,Z, V ⋆
(
Z,QU (·|W,Z)
))]
(87)
= inf
QUZW∈Q0
EQUZW
[
de
(
U,Z, V ⋆
(
Z,PU (·|Z)
))]
(88)
=EPUZ
[
de
(
U,Z, V ⋆
(
Z,PU (·|Z)
))]
. (89)
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Equation (87) is a reformulation by using the best-reply v⋆
(
z, p
)
of Definition III.4 for symbol z ∈ Z
and the belief QU (·|w, z).
Equation (88) comes from Markov chain property U −
− Z −
− W that allows to replace the belief
QU (·|w, z) by PU (·|z).
Equation (89) comes from removing the random variable W since it has no impact on the distortion
function de
(
u, z, v⋆
(
z,PU (·|z)
))
.
For any n and for any encoding strategy σ, the encoder’s long-run distortion is given by
max
τ∈BRd(σ)
dne (σ, τ) = max
τ∈BRd(σ)
∑
un,zn,xn,
yn,vn
n∏
t=1
P
(
ut, zt
)
σ
(
xn
∣∣un) n∏
t=1
T
(
yt
)
τ
(
vn
∣∣yn, zn) · [ 1
n
n∑
t=1
de(ut, zt, vt)
]
(90)
= max
τ∈BRd(σ)
∑
un,zn,vn
n∏
t=1
P
(
ut, zt
)
τ
(
vn
∣∣zn) · [ 1
n
n∑
t=1
de(ut, zt, vt)
]
(91)
=
1
n
n∑
t=1
[ ∑
ut,zt,vt
P
(
ut, zt
)
· 1
(
vt = v
⋆
(
zt,QU (·|zt)
))
· de(ut, zt, vt)
]
(92)
= EP(u,z)
[
de
(
U,Z, V ⋆
(
Z,PU (·|Z)
))]
. (93)
Equation (90) comes from the zero capacity which imposes that the channel outputs Y n are independent
from the channel inputs Xn.
Equation (91) comes from removing the random variables (Xn, Y n) and noting that the decoder’s best-
reply τ
(
vn
∣∣zn) does not depend on yn anymore, since yn is independent of (un, zn).
Equation (92) is a reformulation based on the best-reply v⋆
(
z,PU (·|z)
)
of Definition III.4, for the symbol
z ∈ Z and the belief PU (·|z).
Equation (93) comes from the i.i.d. property of (U,Z) and concludes the proof of Lemma 3.
B. Positive capacity
We now assume that the channel capacity is strictly positive maxPX I(X;Y ) > 0. We define a specific
convex closure in which the information constraint is satisfied with strict inequality and the sets of
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decoder’s best-reply symbols are always singletons.
D̂e = inf
{∑
w
λw ·Ψe(pw) s.t.
∑
w
λw · pw = PU ∈ ∆(U),
and
∑
w
λw · h(pw) > H(U |Z)−max
PX
I(X;Y ),
and ∀(z, w) ∈ Z ×W, V⋆
(
z,QU (·|z, w)
)
is a singleton
}
. (94)
Lemma 4 If maxPX I(X;Y ) > 0, then D̂e = D
⋆
e .
For the proof of Lemma 4, we refers to the similar proof of [4, Lemma A.5, pp. 32]. We denote by P⋆X
the probability distribution that maximizes the mutual information I(X;Y ), we denote by QnUZW the
empirical distribution of the sequence (un, zn, wn) and we denote by Aδ the set of typical sequences
with tolerance δ > 0, defined by
Aδ =
{
(un, zn, wn, xn, yn), s.t. ||QnUZW − PUZQW |U ||1 ≤ δ,
and ||QnXY − P
⋆
XTY |X ||1 ≤ δ
}
. (95)
We denote by Pσ,Ut(·|y
n, zn) ∈ ∆(U) the posterior belief induced by the strategy σ on Ut at stage t,
given (yn, zn). We define Tα(wn, yn, zn) and Bα,γ,δ depending on parameters α > 0 and γ > 0:
Tα(w
n, yn, zn) =
{
t ∈ {1, . . . , n}, s.t. D
(
Pσ,Ut(·|y
n, zn)
∣∣∣∣∣∣QUt(·|wt, zt)) ≤ α22 ln 2
}
, (96)
Bα,γ,δ =
{
(wn, yn, zn), s.t.
|Tα(w
n, yn, zn)|
n
≥ 1− γ and (wn, yn, zn) ∈ Aδ
}
. (97)
The notation Bcα,γ,δ stands for the complementary set of Bα,γ,δ ⊂ W
n × Yn × Zn. The sequences
(wn, yn, zn) belong to the set Bα,γ,δ if, 1) they are typical, 2) the corresponding posterior belief
Pσ,Ut(·|y
n, zn) is close in K-L divergence to the target belief QUt(·|wt, zt), for a large fraction of stages
t ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
The cornerstone of this achievability proof is Proposition B.1, which refines the analysis of Wyner-Ziv’s
source coding by controlling the posterior beliefs of a large fraction of stages.
Proposition B.1 (Wyner-Ziv’s Posterior Beliefs) If the probability distribution PUZQW |U satisfies: maxPX I(X;Y )− I(U ;W |Z) > 0,V⋆(z,QU (·|z, w)) is a singleton ∀(z, w) ∈ Z ×W, (98)
then
∀ε > 0, ∀α > 0, ∀γ > 0, ∃δ¯ > 0, ∀δ < δ¯, ∃n¯ ∈ N⋆, ∀n ≥ n¯,∃σ, s.t. Pσ(B
c
α,γ,δ) ≤ ε. (99)
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The proof of proposition B.1 is stated in App. B-C.
Proposition B.2 For any encoding strategy σ, we have:∣∣∣∣ max
τ∈BRd(σ)
dne (σ, τ)− D̂e
∣∣∣∣ ≤ (α+ 2γ + δ) · φ¯e + (1− Pσ(Bα,γ,δ)) · φ¯e, (100)
where φ¯e = maxu,z,v
∣∣φe(u, z, v)∣∣ is the largest absolute value of encoder’s distortion.
For the proof of Proposition B.2, we refers directly to the similar proof of [4, Lemma A.8, pp. 33].
Corollary B.3 For any ε > 0, there exists n¯ ∈ N⋆ such that for all n ≥ n¯ there exists an encoding
strategy σ such that: ∣∣∣∣ max
τ∈BRd(σ)
dne (σ, τ) − D̂e
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε. (101)
The proof of Corollary B.3 comes from combining Proposition B.1 with Proposition B.2 and choosing
parameters α, γ, δ small and n ∈ N⋆ large. The decoder’s best-reply performs similarly as the Wyner-Ziv’s
decoding scheme. It concludes the achievability proof of Theorem III.3.
C. Proof of Proposition B.1
We assume that the probability distribution PUZQW |U satisfies the two following conditions: maxPX I(X;Y )− I(U ;W |Z) > 0,V⋆(z,QU (·|z, w)) is a singleton ∀(z, w) ∈ Z ×W, (102)
The strict information constraint ensures that there exists a small parameter η > 0 and rates R ≥ 0,
RL ≥ 0, such that
R + RL = I(U ;W ) + η, (103)
RL ≤ I(Z;W )− η, (104)
R ≤ max
PX
I(X;Y )− η. (105)
We now recall the random coding construction of Wyner-Ziv [5] and we investigate the corresponding
posterior beliefs. We note by Σ the random coding scheme, described as follows.
• Random codebook. We introduces the indices m ∈ M with |M| = 2nR and l ∈ ML with |ML| =
2nRL . We draw |M ×ML| = 2n(R+RL) sequences W n(m, l) with the i.i.d. probability distribution
Q⊗nW , and |M| = 2
nR sequencesXn(m), with the i.i.d. probability distribution P⋆⊗nX that maximizes
the channel capacity in (105).
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• Encoding function. The encoder observes the sequence of symbols of source Un ∈ Un and finds a
pair of indices (m, l) ∈ M×ML such that the sequences
(
Un,W n(m, l)
)
∈ Aδ are jointly typical.
It sends the sequence Xn(m) corresponding to the index m ∈ M.
• Decoding function. The decoder observes the sequence of channel output Y n ∈ Yn. It returns an
index mˆ ∈ M such that the sequences
(
Y n,Xn(mˆ)
)
∈ Aδ are jointly typical. Then it observes
the sequence of side information Zn ∈ Zn and returns an index lˆ ∈ ML such that the sequences(
Zn,W n(mˆ, lˆ)
)
∈ Aδ are jointly typical.
• Error Event. We introduce the event of error Eδ ∈ {0, 1} defined as follows:
Eδ =
{
0 if (M,L) = (Mˆ , Lˆ) and
(
Un, Zn,W n,Xn, Y n
)
∈ Aδ,
1 otherwise.
(106)
Expected error probability of the random encoding/decoding Σ. For all ε2 > 0, for all η > 0, there
exists a δ¯ > 0, for all δ ≤ δ¯ there exists n¯ such that for all n ≥ n¯, the expected probability of the
following error events are bounded by ε2:
EΣ
[
P
(
∀(m, l),
(
Un,W n(m, l)
)
/∈ Aδ
)]
≤ ε2, (107)
EΣ
[
P
(
∃l′ 6= l, s.t.
(
Zn,W n(m, l′)
)
∈ Aδ
)]
≤ ε2, (108)
EΣ
[
P
(
∃m′ 6= m, s.t.
(
Y n,Xn(m′)
)
∈ Aδ
)]
≤ ε2, (109)
Equation (107) comes from (103) and the covering lemma [69, pp. 208].
Equation (108) comes from (104) and the packing lemma [69, pp. 46].
Equation (109) comes from (105) and the packing lemma [69, pp. 46].
There exists a coding strategy σ with small error probability:
∀ε2 > 0, ∀η > 0, ∃δ¯ > 0, ∀δ ≤ δ¯, ∃n¯ > 0, ∀n ≥ n¯, ∃σ, Pσ
(
Eδ = 1
)
≤ ε2. (110)
Control of the posterior beliefs. We assume that the event Eδ = 0 is realized. We denote by
Pσ,Ut(·|y
n, zn, Eδ = 0) the conditional probability distribution of Ut given (yn, zn, E = 0), induced
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by the Wyner-Ziv’s encoding strategy σ.
Eσ
[
1
n
n∑
t=1
D
(
Pσ,Ut(·|Y
n, Zn, Eδ = 0)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣QUt(·|Wt, Zt))
]
=
∑
(wn,zn,yn)∈Aδ
Pσ(w
n, zn, yn|Eδ = 0)×
1
n
n∑
t=1
D
(
Pσ,Ut(·|y
n, zn, Eδ = 0)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣QUt(·|wt, zt)) (111)
=
1
n
∑
(un,zn,wn,yn)∈Aδ
Pσ(u
n, zn, wn, yn|Eδ = 0)× log2
1∏n
t=1Q(ut|wt, zt)
−
1
n
n∑
t=1
H(Ut|Y
n, Zn, Eδ = 0)
(112)
≤H(U |W,Z)−
1
n
H(Un|W n, Y n, Zn, Eδ = 0) + δ (113)
≤H(U |W,Z)−
1
n
H(Un|W n, Zn, Eδ = 0) + δ (114)
=H(U |W,Z)−
1
n
H(Un|Eδ = 0) +
1
n
I(Un;W n|Eδ = 0)
+
1
n
H(Zn|W n, Eδ = 0)−
1
n
H(Zn|Un,W n, Eδ = 0) + δ. (115)
Equation (111)-(112) come from the hypothesis Eδ = 0 of typical sequences (un, zn, wn, yn) ∈ Aδ and
the definition of the conditional K-L divergence [72, pp. 24].
Equation (113) comes from property of typical sequences [69, pp. 26] and the conditioning that reduces
entropy.
Equation (114) comes from the Markov chain Zn−
−Un−
−W n−
−Y n induced by the channel and the
strategy σ, that implies H(Un|W n, Zn, Eδ = 0) = H(Un|W n, Y n, Zn, Eδ = 0).
Equation (115) is a reformulation of (114).
We denote by Aδ(zn|wn) the set of sequences zn ∈ Zn that are jointly typical with wn, i.e. ||QnWZ −
QWZ ||1 < δ.
1
n
H(Un|Eδ = 0) ≥H(U)−
1
n
− log2 |U| · Pσ
(
Eδ = 1
)
, (116)
1
n
I(Un;W n|Eδ = 0) ≤R + RL = I(U ;W ) + η, (117)
1
n
H(Zn|W n, Eδ = 0) ≤
1
n
log2 |Aδ(z
n|wn)| ≤ H(Z|W ) + δ, (118)
1
n
H(Zn|Un,W n, Eδ = 0) ≥
1
n
H(Zn|Un,W n)−
1
n
− log2 |U| · Pσ
(
Eδ = 1
)
(119)
=H(Z|U,W )−
1
n
− log2 |U| · Pσ
(
Eδ = 1
)
. (120)
Equation (116) comes from the i.i.d. source and Fano’s inequality.
Equation (117) comes from the cardinality of codebook given by (103). This argument is also used in
[73, Eq. (23)].
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Equation (118) comes from the cardinality of Aδ(zn|wn), see also [69, pp. 27].
Equation (119) comes from Fano’s inequality.
Equation (119) comes from H(Zn|Un,W n) = H(Zn|Un) = H(Z|U) = H(Z|U,W ) due to the Markov
chain Zn −
− Un −
−W n of the encoding σ, the i.i.d. property of the source (U,Z), the Markov chain
Z −
−U −
−W of the single-letter characterization QUZW ∈ Q0.
Equations (115)-(119) shows that on average, the posterior beliefs Pσ,Ut(·|y
n, zn, Eδ = 0) induced by
strategy σ is close to the target probability distribution QU (·|w, z).
Eσ
[
1
n
n∑
t=1
D
(
Pσ,Ut(·|Y
n, Zn, Eδ = 0)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣QUt(·|Wt, Zt))
]
≤2δ + η +
2
n
+ 2 log2 |U| · Pσ
(
Eδ = 1
)
:= ǫ. (121)
Then we have:
Pσ(B
c
α,γ,δ) =1−Pσ(Bα,γ,δ)
=Pσ(Eδ = 1)Pσ(B
c
α,γ,δ|Eδ = 1) + Pσ(Eδ = 0)Pσ(B
c
α,γ,δ|Eδ = 0)
≤Pσ(Eδ = 1) + Pσ(B
c
α,γ,δ|Eδ = 0)
≤ε2 + Pσ(B
c
α,γ,δ|Eδ = 0). (122)
Moreover:
Pσ(B
c
α,γ,δ|Eδ = 0)
=
∑
wn,yn,zn
Pσ
(
(wn, yn, zn) ∈ Bcα,γ,δ
∣∣∣Eδ = 0) (123)
=
∑
wn,yn,zn
Pσ
(
(wn, yn, zn) s.t.
|Tα(w
n, yn, zn)|
n
< 1− γ
∣∣∣∣∣Eδ = 0
)
(124)
=Pσ
(
1
n
·
∣∣∣∣{t, s.t. D(Pσ,Ut(·|yn, zn)∣∣∣∣∣∣QUt(·|wt, zt)) ≤ α22 ln 2
}∣∣∣∣ < 1− γ
∣∣∣∣∣Eδ = 0
)
(125)
=Pσ
(
1
n
·
∣∣∣∣{t, s.t. D(Pσ,Ut(·|yn, zn)∣∣∣∣∣∣QUt(·|wt, zt)) > α22 ln 2
}∣∣∣∣ ≥ γ
∣∣∣∣∣Eδ = 0
)
(126)
≤
2 ln 2
α2γ
· Eσ
[
1
n
n∑
t=1
D
(
Pσ,Ut(·|y
n, zn)
∣∣∣∣∣∣QUt(·|wt, zt))] (127)
≤
2 ln 2
α2γ
·
(
η + δ +
2
n
+ 2 log2 |U| · Pσ
(
Eδ = 1
))
. (128)
Equation (123) to (126) are simple reformulations.
Equation (127) comes from the double use of Markov’s inequality as in [4, Lemma A.21, pp. 42].
Equation (128) comes from (121).
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Combining equations (110), (122), (128) and choosing η > 0 small, we obtain the following statement:
∀ε > 0, ∀α > 0, ∀γ > 0, ∃δ¯ > 0, ∀δ < δ¯, ∃n¯ ∈ N⋆, ∀n ≥ n¯,∃σ, s.t. Pσ(B
c
α,γ,δ) ≤ ε. (129)
This concludes the proof of Proposition B.1.
APPENDIX C
CONVERSE PROOF OF THEOREM III.3
We consider an encoding strategy σ of length n ∈ N⋆. We denote by T the uniform random variable
over {1, . . . , n} and let Z−T stand for (Z1, . . . , Zt−1, Zt+1, . . . Zn), where ZT has been removed. We
introduce the auxiliary random variable W = (Y n, Z−T , T ) whose joint probability distribution PUZW
is defined by
P(u, z, w) =Pσ
(
uT , zT , y
n, z−T , T
)
=P(T = t) · Pσ
(
uT , zT , y
n, z−T
∣∣T = t)
=
1
n
· Pσ
(
ut, zt, y
n, z−t
)
, ∀(u,w, z, un, zn, yn). (130)
This identification ensures that the Markov chainW−
−UT−
−ZT is satisfied. Let us fix a decoding strategy
τV n|Y nZn and define τ˜V |WZ = τ˜V |Y nZ−TTZ = τVT |Y nZn . The encoder’s long-run distortion writes:
dne (σ, τ) =
∑
un,zn,yn
Pσ(u
n, zn, yn)
∑
vn
τ(vn|yn, zn) ·
[
1
n
n∑
t=1
de(ut, zt, vt)
]
(131)
=
n∑
t=1
∑
ut,zt,
z−t,yn
1
n
· Pσ(ut, z
n, yn)
∑
vt
τ(vt|y
n, zn) · de(ut, zt, vt) (132)
=
∑
ut,zt,y
n,
z−t,t
Pσ(ut, zt, y
n, z−t, t)
∑
vt
τ(vt|zt, y
n, z−t, t) · de(ut, zt, vt) (133)
=
∑
u,z,w
P(u, z, w)
∑
v
τ˜(v|w, z) · de(u, z, v). (134)
Equations (131) - (133) are reformulations and re-orderings.
Equation (134) comes from replacing the random variables (Y n, Z−T , T ) by W whose distribution is
defined in (130).
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Equations (131) - (134) are also valid for the decoder’s distortion dn
d
(σ, τ) =
∑
u,z,
w,v
P(u, z, w)τ˜ (v|w, z)·
dd(u, z, v). A best-reply strategy τ ∈ BRd(σ) reformulates as:
τ ∈ argminτ ′
V n|Y nZn
∑
un,zn,
xn,yn,vn
Pσ(u
n, zn, xn, yn) · τ ′(vn|yn, zn) ·
[
1
n
n∑
t=1
φd(ut, zt, vt)
]
(135)
⇐⇒τ˜V |WZ ∈ argminτ˜ ′
V |WZ
∑
u,z,w
P(u, z, w) · τ˜ ′(v|w, z) · φd(u, z, v) (136)
⇐⇒τ˜V |WZ ∈ Q2
(
PUZW
)
. (137)
We now prove that the distribution PUZW defined in (130), satisfies the information constraint of the set
Q0.
0 ≤I(Xn;Y n)− I(Un, Zn;Y n) (138)
≤
n∑
t=1
H(Yt)−
n∑
t=1
H(Yt|Xt)− I(U
n;Y n|Zn) (139)
≤n ·max
PX
I(X;Y )−
n∑
t=1
I(Ut;Y
n|Zn, U t−1) (140)
=n ·max
PX
I(X;Y )−
n∑
t=1
I(Ut;Y
n, Z−t, U t−1|Zt) (141)
≤n ·max
PX
I(X;Y )−
n∑
t=1
I(Ut;Y
n, Z−t|Zt) (142)
=n ·max
PX
I(X;Y )− n · I(UT ;Y
n, Z−T |ZT , T ) (143)
=n ·max
PX
I(X;Y )− n · I(UT ;Y
n, Z−T , T |ZT ) (144)
=n ·max
PX
I(X;Y )− n · I(U ;W |Z) (145)
=n ·
(
max
PX
I(X;Y )− I(U ;W ) + I(Z;W )
)
. (146)
Equation (138) comes from the Markov chain Y n −
−Xn −
− (Un, Zn).
Equation (139) comes from the memoryless property of the channel and from removing the positive term
I(Un;Zn) ≥ 0.
Equation (140) comes from taking the maximum over PX and the chain rule.
Equation (141) comes from the i.i.d. property of the source (U,Z) which implies I(Ut, Zt;Z−t, U t−1) =
I(Ut;Z
−t, U t−1|Zt) = 0.
Equation (142) comes from removing I(Ut;U t−1|Y n, Z−t, Zt) ≥ 0.
Equation (143) comes from the uniform random variable T ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Equation (144) comes from the independence between T and the source (U,Z), which implies
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I(UT , ZT ;T ) = I(UT ;T |ZT ) = 0.
Equation (145) comes from the identification W = (Y n, Z−T , T ).
Equation (146) comes from the Markov chain W −
−UT −
−ZT . This proves that the distribution Pσ,UZW
belongs to the set Q0.
Therefore, for any encoding strategy σ and all n, we have:
max
τ∈BRd(σ)
dne (σ, τ) (147)
= max
τ˜V |WZ∈
Q2(PUZW )
∑
u,z,w
P(u, z, w)
∑
v
τ˜(v|w, z) · de(u, z, v) (148)
= max
τ˜V |WZ∈
Q2(PUZW )
EP(u,z,w)
τ˜V |WZ
[
de(U,Z, V )
]
(149)
≥ inf
QUZW∈Q0
max
QV |WZ∈
Q2(QUZW )
E QUZW
QV |WZ
[
de(U,Z, V )
]
= D⋆e. (150)
The last inequality comes from the probability distribution PUZW satisfying the information constraint
of the set Q0.
The proof for the cardinality bound |W| = min(|U| + 1, |V||Z|) follows two arguments. The bound
|W| = |U| + 1 comes [71, Corollary 17.1.5, pp. 157], also in [4, Corollary A.2, pp. 26]. The bound
|W| = |V||Z| comes from assuming that the encoder tells to the decoder to select a function from the
side information Z to the symbols V , as discussed in Sec. III-D.
This concludes the proof of (19) in Theorem III.3.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF PROPOSITION IV.2
The average distortion Ψe(q) defined in (52) is piece-wise linear, hence the optimal triple of posteriors
may belong to distinct intervals q1 ∈ [0, ν1), q2 ∈ [ν1, ν2), q3 ∈ [ν2, 1]. Since δ0 = δ1 and κ = 0, the
function Ψe(q) is symmetric and constant over the interval [ν1, ν2], as depicted in Fig 7. The optimal
splitting must satisfy (q1, q2, q3) = (q1,
1
2 , 1 − q1), since q2 =
1
2 provides the highest entropy h(q2) =
H(U |Z). Equations (57)-(59) reformulate as
λ1 =
1
2
·
C
H(U |Z)− h(q1)
, (151)
λ2 =1−
C
H(U |Z)− h(q1)
, (152)
λ3 =
1
2
·
C
H(U |Z)− h(q1)
. (153)
November 9, 2019 DRAFT
34
We examine the feasibility conditions, i.e. (λ1, λ2, λ3) ∈ [0, 1]3. We recall that the notation
h−1
(
H(U |Z) − C
)
stands for the unique solution q ∈ [0, 12 ] of the equation h(q) = H(U |Z) − C .
Since H(U |Z) ≥ h(q1) for all q1, we have λ1 ≥ 0, λ2 ≤ 1 and λ3 ≥ 0, moreover
λ1 ≤ 1⇐⇒ h(q1) ≤ H(U |Z)−
1
2
· C ⇐⇒ q1 ≤ h
−1
(
H(U |Z)−
1
2
· C
)
(154)
λ2 ≥ 0⇐⇒ h(q1) ≤ H(U |Z)− C ⇐⇒ q1 ≤ h
−1
(
H(U |Z)− C
)
. (155)
Since the function h−1 is increasing over the interval [0, 1], we have h−1
(
H(U |Z) − 12 · C
)
≤
h−1
(
H(U |Z)− C
)
. This proves the following Lemma.
Lemma 5 The splitting (q1, q2, q3) = (q1,
1
2 , 1− q1) is feasible if and only if
q1 ≤ h
−1
(
H(U |Z)− C
)
. (156)
We assume that (q1, q2, q3) = (q1,
1
2 , 1− q1), we define the encoder’s distortion function by
Φe(q1) =λ1Ψe(q1) + λ2Ψe
(1
2
)
+ λ3Ψe(1− q1) (157)
=
1
2
·
C
H(U |Z)− h(q1)
· q1 +
(
1−
C
H(U |Z)− h(q1)
)
· δ +
1
2
·
C
H(U |Z)− h(q1)
· q1 (158)
=δ −
(δ − q1) · C
H(U |Z)− h(q1)
, (159)
Its derivative is
Φ′e(q1) =
C
(H(U |Z)− h(q1))2
·
(
H(U |Z)− h(q1)− h
′(q1) · (δ − q1)
)
, (160)
where the derivative of the entropy h′(q) writes
h′(q) = log2
1− q
q
− (1− 2 · δ) · log2
1− q ⋆ δ
q ⋆ δ
. (161)
We examine the term k(q) =
(
H(U |Z) − h(q) − h′(q) · (δ − q)
)
of the function Φ′e(q). We have
limq→0 k(q) = −∞ since limq→0 h′(q) = +∞ and k(δ) = H(U |Z) − h(δ) = Hb(δ ⋆ δ) − Hb(δ) > 0
since δ < 12 . The derivative k
′(q) = −h′′(q) · (δ − q) > 0 is strictly positive because δ > q and the
entropy is strictly concave h′′(q) < 0. Hence the equation k(q) = 0 has a unique solution q⋆ ∈ (0, δ[.
The derivative Φ′e(q) is non-positive on the interval q ∈ (0, q
⋆] and non-negative on the interval
q ∈ [q⋆, δ), hence the distortion Φe(q) reaches its minimum in q⋆.
1) If q⋆ ≤ h−1
(
H(U |Z)−C
)
, then the optimal splitting is
q1 = q
⋆ q2 =
1
2 q3 = 1− q
⋆
λ1 =
1
2 ·
C
H(U |Z)−h(q⋆) λ2 = 1−
C
H(U |Z)−h(q⋆) λ3 =
1
2 ·
C
H(U |Z)−h(q⋆)
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corresponding to the strategies
α1 = (1− q
⋆) · C
H(U |Z)−h(q⋆) α2 = 1−
C
H(U |Z)−h(q⋆) α3 = q
⋆ · C
H(U |Z)−h(q⋆)
β1 = q
⋆ · C
H(U |Z)−h(q⋆) β2 = 1−
C
H(U |Z)−h(q⋆) β3 = (1− q
⋆) · C
H(U |Z)−h(q⋆)
and the optimal distortion is
D⋆e =δ −C ·
δ − q⋆
H(U |Z)− h(q⋆)
. (162)
2) If q⋆ > h−1
(
H(U |Z)−C
)
, then the optimal splitting is
q1 = h
−1
(
H(U |Z)− C
)
q2 =
1
2 q3 = 1− h
−1
(
H(U |Z)− C
)
λ1 =
1
2 λ2 = 0 λ3 =
1
2
corresponding to the strategies
α1 = 1− h
−1
(
H(U |Z)− C
)
α2 = 0 α3 = h
−1
(
H(U |Z)− C
)
β1 = h
−1
(
H(U |Z)− C
)
β2 = 0 β3 = 1− h
−1
(
H(U |Z)− C
)
and the optimal distortion is
D⋆e =h
−1
(
H(U |Z)− C
)
. (163)
3) If C > H(U |Z), then the extreme splitting (q1, q3) = (0, 1) is feasible and D⋆e = 0.
This concludes the proof of Proposition IV.2.
REFERENCES
[1] M. Le Treust and T. Tomala, “Information design for strategic coordination of autonomous devices with non-aligned
utilities,” in 54th Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing (Allerton), pp. 233–242, Sept.
2016.
[2] ——, “Persuasion bayésienne pour la coordination stratégique d’appareils autonomes ayant des objectifs non-alignés,” in
Actes de la Conférence du Groupement de Recherche en Traitement du Signal et des Images (GRETSI17), Juan-les-Pins,
France, 2017.
[3] ——, “Strategic coordination with state information at the decoder,” Proc. of 2018 International Zurich Seminar on
Information and Communication, 2018.
[4] ——, “Persuasion with limited communication capacity,” Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 184, p. 104940, 2019.
[5] A. D. Wyner and J. Ziv, “The rate-distortion function for source coding with side information at the decoder,” IEEE
Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 1–11, Jan. 1976.
[6] N. Merhav and S. Shamai, “On joint source-channel coding for the Wyner-Ziv source and the Gel’fand-Pinsker channel,”
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 49, no. 11, pp. 2844–2855, 2003.
November 9, 2019 DRAFT
36
[7] E. Kamenica and M. Gentzkow, “Bayesian persuasion,” American Economic Review, vol. 101, pp. 2590–2615, 2011.
[8] E. Akyol, C. Langbort, and T. Bas¸ar, “Strategic compression and transmission of information,” in IEEE Information Theory
Workshop - Fall (ITW), Oct 2015, pp. 219–223.
[9] ——, “On the role of side information in strategic communication,” in IEEE International Symposium on Information
Theory (ISIT), July 2016, pp. 1626–1630.
[10] ——, “Information-theoretic approach to strategic communication as a hierarchical game,” Proceedings of the IEEE, vol.
105, no. 2, pp. 205–218, 2017.
[11] V. P. Crawford and J. Sobel, “Strategic information transmission,” Econometrica, vol. 50, no. 6, pp. 1431–1451, 1982.
[12] V. S. S. Nadendla, C. Langbort, and T. Bas¸ar, “Effects of subjective biases on strategic information transmission,” IEEE
Transactions on Communications, vol. 66, no. 12, pp. 6040–6049, Dec. 2018.
[13] S. Sarıtas¸, S. Yüksel, and S. Gezici, “Dynamic signaling games with quadratic criteria under nash and stackelberg equilibria,”
preprint available [on-line] https://arxiv.org/abs/1704.03816, 2017.
[14] ——, “Quadratic multi-dimensional signaling games and affine equilibria,” IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control,
vol. 62, no. 2, pp. 605–619, Feb. 2017.
[15] S. Sarıtas¸, S. Gezici, and S. Yüksel, “Hypothesis testing under subjective priors and costs as a signaling game,” IEEE
Transactions on Signal Processing, vol. 67, no. 19, pp. 5169–5183, Oct. 2019.
[16] F. Farokhi, A. M. H. Teixeira, and C. Langbort, “Estimation with strategic sensors,” IEEE Transactions on Automatic
Control, vol. 62, no. 2, pp. 724–739, Feb. 2017.
[17] J. Y. Y. Jakub Marecˇek, Robert Shorten, “Signaling and obfuscation for congestion control,” ACM SIGecom Exchanges,
vol. 88, no. 10, pp. 2086–2096, 2015.
[18] H. Tavafoghi and D. Teneketzis, “Informational incentives for congestion games,” in 55th Annual Allerton Conference on
Communication, Control, and Computing (Allerton), pp. 1285–1292, Oct. 2017.
[19] S. Dughmi and H. Xu, “Algorithmic bayesian persuasion,” In Proceedings of the 47th ACM Symposium on Theory of
Computing (STOC), 2016.
[20] S. Dughmi, “Algorithmic information structure design: A survey,” ACM SIGecom Exchanges, vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 2–24, Jan
2017.
[21] S. Dughmi, D. Kempe, and R. Qiang, “Persuasion with limited communication,” In Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference
on Economics and Computation (ACM EC’17), Maastricht, The Netherlands, 2016.
[22] R. Berry and D. Tse, “Shannon meets Nash on the interference channel,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory,
vol. 57, no. 5, pp. 2821–2836, May 2011.
[23] S. M. Perlaza, R. Tandon, H. V. Poor, and Z. Han, “Perfect output feedback in the two-user decentralized interference
channel,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 61, no. 10, pp. 5441–5462, Oct. 2015.
[24] A. E. Gamal and T. Cover, “Achievable rates for multiple descriptions,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 28,
no. 6, pp. 851–857, Nov. 1982.
[25] A. Lapidoth, A. Malär, and M. Wigger, “Constrained source-coding with side information,” IEEE Transactions on
Information Theory, vol. 60, no. 6, pp. 3218–3237, June 2014.
[26] A. Dembo and T. Weissman, “The minimax distortion redundancy in noisy source coding,” IEEE Transactions on
Information Theory, vol. 49, no. 11, pp. 3020–3030, Nov. 2003.
[27] R. Timo, A. Grant, and G. Kramer, “Lossy broadcasting with complementary side information,” IEEE Transactions on
Information Theory, vol. 59, no. 1, pp. 104–131, Jan. 2013.
November 9, 2019 DRAFT
37
[28] H. Yamamoto, “A rate-distortion problem for a communication system with a secondary decoder to be hindered,” IEEE
Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 34, no. 4, pp. 835–842, July 1988.
[29] H. Yamamoto, “Rate-distortion theory for the shannon cipher system,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 43,
no. 3, pp. 827–835, May 1997.
[30] C. Schieler and P. Cuff, “Rate-distortion theory for secrecy systems,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 60,
no. 12, pp. 7584–7605, Dec 2014.
[31] ——, “The henchman problem: Measuring secrecy by the minimum distortion in a list,” IEEE Transactions on Information
Theory, vol. 62, no. 6, pp. 3436–3450, June 2016.
[32] A. Lapidoth, “On the role of mismatch in rate distortion theory,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 43, no. 1,
pp. 38–47, Jan. 1997.
[33] N. Merhav, G. Kaplan, A. Lapidoth, and S. Shamai Shitz, “On information rates for mismatched decoders,” IEEE
Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 40, no. 6, pp. 1953–1967, Nov. 1994.
[34] R. Zamir, “The index entropy of a mismatched codebook,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 48, no. 2, pp.
523–528, Feb. 2002.
[35] A. Somekh-Baruch, “A general formula for the mismatch capacity,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 61,
no. 9, pp. 4554–4568, Sep. 2015.
[36] J. Scarlett, A. Martinez, and A. Guillén i Fàbregas, “Multiuser random coding techniques for mismatched decoding,” IEEE
Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 62, no. 7, pp. 3950–3970, July 2016.
[37] L. Zhou, V. Y. F. Tan, and M. Motani, “The dispersion of mismatched joint source-channel coding for arbitrary sources
and additive channels,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 65, no. 4, pp. 2234–2251, April 2019.
[38] F. Forges, “Non-zero-sum repeated games and information transmission,” in: N. Meggido, Essays in Game Theory in Honor
of Michael Maschler, Springer-Verlag, no. 6, pp. 65–95, 1994.
[39] H. von Stackelberg, Marketform und Gleichgewicht. Oxford University Press, 1934.
[40] J. Nash, “Non-cooperative games,” Annals of Mathematics, vol. 54, pp. 286–295, 1951.
[41] D. Bergemann and S. Morris, “Information design, bayesian persuasion, and bayes correlated equilibrium,” American
Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, vol. 106, no. 5, pp. 586–591, May 2016.
[42] I. Taneva, “Information design,” Manuscript, School of Economics, The University of Edinburgh, 2016.
[43] D. Bergemann and S. Morris, “Information design: a unified perspective,” Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No 2075,
2017.
[44] R. Alonso and O. Câmara, “Bayesian persuasion with heterogeneous priors,” Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 165, pp.
672–706, 2016.
[45] M. Laclau and L. Renou, “Public persuasion,” working paper, Feb. 2017.
[46] E. Tsakas and N. Tsakas, “Noisy persuasion,” working paper, 2017.
[47] A. Blume, O. J. Board, and K. Kawamura, “Noisy talk,” Theoretical Economics, vol. 2, pp. 395–440, July 2007.
[48] P. Hernández and B. von Stengel, “Nash codes for noisy channels,” Operations Research, vol. 62, no. 6, pp. 1221–1235,
Nov. 2014.
[49] C. Sims, “Implication of rational inattention,” Journal of Monetary Economics, vol. 50, no. 3, pp. 665–690, April 2003.
[50] M. Gentzkow and E. Kamenica, “Costly persuasion,” American Economic Review, vol. 104, pp. 457–462, 2014.
[51] A. Neyman and D. Okada, “Strategic entropy and complexity in repeated games,” Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 29,
no. 1–2, pp. 191–223, 1999.
[52] ——, “Repeated games with bounded entropy,” Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 30, no. 2, pp. 228–247, 2000.
November 9, 2019 DRAFT
38
[53] ——, “Growth of strategy sets, entropy, and nonstationary bounded recall,” Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 66, no. 1,
pp. 404–425, 2009.
[54] O. Gossner and N. Vieille, “How to play with a biased coin?” Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 41, no. 2, pp. 206–226,
2002.
[55] O. Gossner and T. Tomala, “Empirical distributions of beliefs under imperfect observation,” Mathematics of Operation
Research, vol. 31, no. 1, pp. 13–30, 2006.
[56] ——, “Secret correlation in repeated games with imperfect monitoring,” Mathematics of Operation Research, vol. 32,
no. 2, pp. 413–424, 2007.
[57] O. Gossner, R. Laraki, and T. Tomala, “Informationally optimal correlation,” Mathematical Programming, vol. 116, no.
1-2, pp. 147–172, 2009.
[58] O. Gossner, P. Hernández, and A. Neyman, “Optimal use of communication resources,” Econometrica, vol. 74, no. 6, pp.
1603–1636, 2006.
[59] P. Cuff and L. Zhao, “Coordination using implicit communication,” IEEE Information Theory Workshop (ITW), pp. 467–
471, 2011.
[60] P. Cuff, H. Permuter, and T. Cover, “Coordination capacity,” Information Theory, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 56, no. 9,
pp. 4181–4206, Sept. 2010.
[61] P. Cuff and C. Schieler, “Hybrid codes needed for coordination over the point-to-point channel,” in 49th Annual Allerton
Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing (Allerton), pp. 235–239, Sept. 2011.
[62] M. Le Treust, “Joint empirical coordination of source and channel,” IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, vol. 63,
no. 8, pp. 5087–5114, Aug. 2017.
[63] G. Cervia, L. Luzzi, M. Le Treust, and M. R. Bloch, “Strong coordination of signals and actions over noisy channels with
two-sided state information,” preprint available [on-line] https://arxiv.org/abs/1801.10543, 2018.
[64] C. E. Shannon, “A mathematical theory of communication,” Bell System Technical Journal, vol. 27, pp. 379–423, 1948.
[65] M. Le Treust, “Empirical coordination with two-sided state information and correlated source and state,” in IEEE
International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT), 2015, pp. 466–470.
[66] M. Le Treust and M. Bloch, “Empirical coordination, state masking and state amplification: Core of the decoder’s
knowledge,” IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT), pp. 895–899, 2016.
[67] ——, “State leakage and coordination of actions: Core of decoder’s knowledge,” preprint available [on-line]
https://arxiv.org/abs/1812.07026, Dec. 2018.
[68] M. Fekete, “Über die verteilung der wurzeln bei gewissen algebraischen gleichungen mit ganzzahligen koeffizienten,”
Mathematische Zeitschrift, vol. 17, no. 1, pp. 228–249, Dec. 1923.
[69] A. E. Gamal and Y.-H. Kim, Network Information Theory. Cambridge University Press, Dec. 2011.
[70] R. Aumann and M. Maschler, Repeated Games with Incomplete Information. MIT Press, Cambrige, MA, 1995.
[71] R. Rockafellar, Convex Analysis, ser. Princeton landmarks in mathematics and physics.
[72] T. M. Cover and J. A. Thomas, Elements of information theory. New York: 2nd. Ed., Wiley-Interscience, 2006.
[73] N. Merhav and S. Shamai, “Information rates subject to state masking,” Information Theory, IEEE Transactions on, vol. 53,
no. 6, pp. 2254–2261, June 2007.
November 9, 2019 DRAFT
